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FINDING FAIRNESS IN A HIGH 
VOLUME STATUTORY ADR 
ENVIRONMENT: OBSERVATIONS 








 Pre-hearing compulsory Appropriate Dispute Resolution processes (ADR) is increasingly popular 
in the Australian judicial system, with expectations of achieving fair, quick and efficient resolution of 
disputes and a reduction in the number of lengthy expensive court based proceedings. While new 
jurisdictions are enthusiastically incorporating compulsory pre- hearing ADR there is little research on 
longstanding institutions. The private nature of these court annexed ADR processes can be an inherent 
weakness; allowing less rigorous use of ADR processes to go unchecked and potentially lessening 
achievement of substantive justice for individual appellants. 
 In Victoria the Accident Compensation Conciliation Service (ACCS) conciliates all disputes 
between Work Cover insurers and workers as a compulsory step before proceedings can be taken in 
court. This paper seeks indicators of how well the ACCS is currently achieving the Workplace Injury 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (the Act)’s Objectives compared to historical outcomes by 
examining trends in new applications and resolution rates, and levels of human resources. These statistical 
trends are derived from 10 consecutive Annual Reports. Key areas explored include power imbalances, 
work intensification, fairness and selection of assessment criteria. This analysis found resolution rates are 
slowly declining and workloads are intensifying. Questions remain about how these trends will impact on 
public confidence in these justice processes and what is meant by ‘reasonable efforts to bring the parties to 
agreement’. Developing assessment criteria for conciliation processes is identified as a future industry 
wide project essential for the credibility of mandatory statutory ADR. 
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Introduction 
 This paper addresses the problem of variability in statutory Appropriate Dispute Resolution 
processes (ADR) processes by exploring factors influencing the achievement of substantive justice, 
fairness, for appellants. Fairness is the corner stone of all justice processes, whether formal adversarial 
processes traditionally associated with western court systems or emerging alternative processes such as 
mediation and conciliation. Importantly, neurobiology reveals spontaneous changes in the brain in 
response to the experience of unfairness. We cannot avoid people’s reaction to unfairness, but we can 
better understand reactions and work to reduce unfairness and its impact. 
 Using a case study approach this paper draws from the author’s experience and insights as an 
ADR practitioner conducting over 1,000 WorkCover statutory conciliations between injured workers and 
insurers about entitlements to compensation. Data is obtained from publically available Annual General 
Reports is presented in time series graphs and trends are analysed. Key areas identified as impacting on 
outcomes include resolution rates, the limited influence Conciliators have over repeat players’ behaviours, 
changes in management priorities and work intensification. These findings raise questions about 
assessment criteria and start to challenge the assumptions implicit in selecting ‘satisfaction’ as the critical 
criteria measuring success of statutory ADR processes. 
 
Context 
 In the Australian state of Victoria at least 73 separate pieces of legislation refer to ADR (Arthur, 
2014). The Civil Procedure Act 2010 Vic introduced a number of themes and objects that aimed to facilitate 
the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute (Sec 1 (1) (1c)). These included 
proportionality, early settlement of disputes by agreement between the parties, and the efficient conduct of 
the business of the court. The Civil Procedure Act 2010 makes reference to the extent to which the parties have 
used reasonable endeavours to resolve the dispute and the extent to which the parties have had the benefit of legal advice and 
representation (Sec 9 (2)). It further defines proportionality as minimising delay and dealing with a proceeding in a 
manner proportionate to the complexity or importance of the issues in dispute and the amount in dispute (Sec 9 (1)) and 
amply sets the scene for the spread of statutory ADR processes in Victoria. 
 Although the Civil Procedure Act 2010 sets out these general expectations, ADR processes are 
referred to only by titles such as mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, judicial resolution 
conference, expert determination and arbitration. There is a lack of substantive detail about what these 
processes actual entail. Conciliation is the statutory ADR process most frequently mandated, and is the 
focus of this study. In 2003 the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) 
encouraged greater consistency of ADR terms by providing standardised descriptions of common terms. 
Conciliation is described as: 
 The conciliator may advise on or determine the process…make suggestions for terms of 
 settlement, give expert advice on likely settlement terms and may actively encourage participants 
 to reach agreement. (NADRAC, 2003) 
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 This description of conciliation provides only the most general of guidance, leaving much scope 
for interpretation and little assistance in the selection of process evaluation and assessment criteria. 
Additionally, this author has not found evidence based research that explores variations in practise nor 
evidence based attempts to identify correlations between practise models and outcomes. While there are 
many claims of popularity, satisfaction and benefits, there is little evidence of how particular models of 
statutory conciliation are associated with settlement rates (Urwin, 2012). 
 
The Victorian Accident Compensation Conciliation Service (ACCS) 
 Victoria has a statutory no-blame system of insurance (the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2013 Victoria (the Act)) for workers who are injured at work. The Act also establishes 
an independent service (the ACCS) that conciliates disputes between a worker and insurer about 
entitlements. The Act sets out that Conciliation Officers are independent Governor – in- Council 
appointments, that is, they are appointed and answerable directly to the Minister and must be persons 
who can demonstrate the highest level of integrity and impartiality. The Act does not specify any skills or 
qualifications for these appointments. 
 Although the majority of matters are superficially a two party dispute, the employer who pays 
premiums to the selected insurer and the Victorian statutory agency WorkSafe who acts as regulator, are 
silent partners. In effect the insurer answers to both the employer and the regulator as interested parties. 
In this is high volume environment approximately 18,000 disputes per year are handled by about 35 
Conciliation Officers with the support of administrative staff. This creates a workload of about 12 new 
disputes per week for each full-time Conciliation Officer position, and hearing rooms scheduled at one 
and half hours per matter. 
 The Act is silent on the actual mechanics of the conciliation process, as was its predecessor, but 
creates conciliation at ACCS as a mandatory step before the worker can proceed to Court. The Act compels 
injured workers to take reasonable steps to resolve the dispute at the conciliation stage, but there is no 
corresponding statutory requirement for the Insurer’s Agent. This limits the Conciliation Officer’s 
capacity to influence the behaviour of Insurer’s Agents and is particularly concerning in light of the power 
differentials of the parties. Although Ministerial guidelines establish standards of behaviour for Insurer’s 
Agents, and consequences for serious breaches, in reality these have become ineffective because breaches 
identified by Conciliation Officers can be dismissed administratively before taking effect. 
 The Act requires that Conciliation Officers maintain confidentiality regarding the substance of 
the dispute, but is silent about the parties’ requirement to keep confidentiality. In practise this means 
Insurer’s Agents can talk freely about a worker’s personal injury matters. Confidentiality is considered a 
cornerstone of ADR processes as it allows the parties to reveal personal and private matters without fear of 
being publically exposed. In this arena, only one party has personal and private matters, the other party is 
a professional representing the insurer. Although the Act states that information revealed in conciliation is 
privileged, the reality is that Insurer’s Agents can obtain clues about what corroborating evidence is needed 
if the matter does not settle and proceeds to Court. 
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 The Act does not establish what processes are considered essential or required characteristics of a 
conciliation process. Rather it states: 
 
 A Conciliation Officer must, having regard to the need to be fair, informal, quick and efficient 
 and having regard to the objects of the Act, make all reasonable efforts to conciliate in 
 connection with a dispute and to bring the parties to agreement 
 (WIRC, 2013, Sec. 293) 
 
 While the Act is silent about the process, successive Annual Reports adhere to the standard 
process as defined by NADRAC citing conciliation as a process whereby the Conciliation Officer assists 
the parties to: 
• identify the issues relevant to the dispute, 
• develop potential resolution options, 
• consider alternatives and consequences, and 
• endeavour to reach an agreement (ACCS Annual Report 2014/25, 3) 
 
 A Conciliation Officer can request medical reports be obtained and may refer a matter to the 
Medical Panel, which will examine the person and make a binding decision about a medical question. A 
Conciliation Officer may decide that there is no genuine dispute, that is, the insurer has no defence to the 
worker’s appeal. In this situation the Conciliation Officer may issue a Direction for certain benefits to be 
directed to the worker. This creates a conciliation/arbitration model with specific limitations. 
 A key characteristic of this statutory conciliation process is the predominance of repeat players. 
These repeat players are the insurers' professional staff, i.e. the Insurer’s Agents, and the worker’s 
representatives. While very few workers have more than one conciliation conference it is estimated there 
about 200 individual repeat players, each of whom may participate in many conciliations per week. There is 
anecdotal evidence of the impact of repeat players on the way the conciliation is conducted, what content 
is discussed, what offers and counter offers are made and what outcomes are reached. The behaviour of 
this group is not bound by statute and may be influenced by organisational motivations such as 
performance bonuses and promotions. The growing criticisms of insurers’ behaviour and decisions led to 
the Victorian Ombudsman’s recent investigation where it found that insurers persistently maintained 
unreasonable decisions at conciliation (Victorian Ombudsman, 2016). 
 
Literature Review 
 Notwithstanding this statutory focus on ADR processes there is little, if any, agreement in 
practise about what processes are actually used. Bayliss (1999) identified random variation in processes 
that are unrelated to the characteristics of the dispute. These included whether or not the process was 
voluntary or mandatory, limits to confidentiality and privilege, the agency’s role in enforcing the settlement 
and whether or not there is a determinative role. There were also marked variations in the prescribed 
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characteristics of the ADR practitioner, regarding the requisite skills, qualifications and the nature of the 
appointment. Appointments varied from independent roles via a judicial or Governor in Council 
appointment, to in-house employees or external contractors. Bayliss (1999) also found a wide variation in 
practise around the giving of advice and guidance on substantive matters. 
 Despite these variations in practise, it would be bizarre in a statutory context for the conciliator 
not to comment on the substance of the dispute or not to put forward options for resolution. Similarly, the 
statutory independence of the ADR practitioners is considered essential to the impartiality and absence of 
bias required to achieve fairness and justice (Van Gramberg, 2006). 
 
Privatisation of justice: power differentials and the delivery of fairness 
 Achieving a fair outcome relies to a certain extent on each individual’s understanding of fairness 
within their social context. However, the private nature of statutory conciliation limits access to 
knowledge about what is considered a fair and reasonable entitlement. This primarily affects workers, who 
have limited access to information about what other workers might settle for. The repeat players, 
Insurance Agents and Workers Representatives, have access to volumes of information about settlements. 
This places the burden on the Conciliation Officer to reveal to the worker the normal range of outcomes in 
the presenting circumstances. However, if the Insurance Agent does not act reasonably during the 
conciliation, refuses to undertake a proper review, provide relevant information or unreasonably challenges 
the worker’s credibility there is little leverage that the Conciliation Officer has to moderate this conduct. 
The Conciliation Officer has limited authority to moderate the negative impact of the power differentials 
and relies primarily on the good grace of the Insurance Agent. The resulting outcome may then fall short 
of what is considered fair and reasonable. 
 Power differentials exist in every society, part of the role of a justice process is to ensure that 
these power differentials do not impact on the delivery of fair outcomes. In 1985 the Commissioner for 
Equal Opportunity identified that power differentials were impacting on the types of settlement being 
achieved. The Commissioner found that: 
 
 the more vulnerable the person, the more likely to experience discrimination and to have fewer 
 resources to combat, this being the case the worker has no alternative but to accept whatever the 
 conciliator is able to negotiate for them. 
 (Commissioner for Equal Opportunity 1985, in Scutt, 1988, 508) 
 
 Large insurance corporations, who send professional representatives to conciliation, are joined 
with the employer and to a lesser extent the WorkSafe regulator who keeps a watchful eye on the 
payments of benefits, with a focus on trends and outliers. On the other side is the individual worker, who 
may or may not have the support of a Worker’s Representative. Ignoring these power differentials can 
only serve to strengthen the party with the greatest power, in this case the insurer (Scutt, 1988), with the 
effect of reducing the prospect of fair outcomes being consistently achieved. 
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 Delivering fairness requires attention to the outcomes not just the process. The ADR profession 
has emerged in recognition of the limits and potential disadvantages of the adversarial justice processes. 
These are legitimate and real concerns. However, this enthusiasm for procedural justice and an informal 
approach, has been at the expense of attention to fairness of outcomes. Sensitivity to interactional justice 
has led to an over emphasis on the positive impact of respectful and empathetic interactions with the 
ADR practitioner (Papgari Sangareddy, 2009). It is generally accepted that meeting expectations of 
procedural justice, i.e. consistency, impartially and the right of reply, will positively influences parties’ 
belief that the outcome is fair irrespective of normative ideas of fairness (Tyler, 1988). However, neither 
interactional nor procedural justice is a substitute for substantive fairness (Webster 2010). 
Neurobiological research has found that our reactions to fairness, or its lack, are hardwired (Singer, et al, 
2006).  More than procedural and interactional justice, parties need and want distributive, otherwise 
known as substantive, justice. 
 Our understanding of the delivery of justice via ADR processes needs to take into account power 




 Using a case study approach, a review was conducted of publically available data from a single 
statutory ADR organisation. Statistics from 10 consecutive ACCS Annual Reports, 2004/5 to 2014/15, 
were collated and presented as a time series graphs. Stakeholder surveys was also reviewed, however these 
survey changed significantly in 2014 and 2015 thereby reducing their usefulness in a undertaking a time 
series study. The analysis was informed by the author’s experience as a statutory conciliation at ACCS, 
conducting over 1,000 conciliations and maintaining a settlement rate of 10% higher than average over a 
2½ year period. 
 A time series comparative analysis was chosen to explore whether or not there were any co-
relational trends between internal variables. The variables of interest were the resolution rates, time taken 
to complete matters, ADR staffing levels and the full-time part-time mix. The study included the 
Conciliation Officers and excluded administrative staffing levels in order to obtain an understanding of 
the impact, if any, of ADR work rate on resolution rate. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
The analysis focuses on the work rate of the Conciliation Officer in relation to the resolution rate. The 
first time-series graph is of the overall ACCS resolution rates of completed matters. A completed matter is 
a dispute that has been conciliated and finalised with or without a resolution. Matters not resolution may 
proceed to Court. There has been a steady decline in the resolution rates, from a high of 71.8% in 
2007/08 to the current low of 62.3% in 2014/15. This means there are either unhappier workers or more 
matters are proceeding to Court, or both. 
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1 The resolution rate of completed matters 
ACCS Annual Reports; series 2004/5 to 2014/15 
 
 There are a number of factors which may be impacting on the Conciliation Officers’ capacity to 
bring the parties to agreement. Some of these are external, such as the reasonableness of the Insurance 
Agents’ conduct and decision-making or the legal complexity and ambiguity of the matters. Worker’s 
expectations regarding their entitlement and their attitudes to proceeding to Court will also influence the 
resolution rates. Other external factors may relate to the organisation of the ACCS; such as the volume of 
work allocated and pressure to complete matters within short time frames irrespective of possibilities for 
resolution, the allocation of complex or simple matters, the capacity of individual Conciliation Officers to 
work part time and the administrative support available. 
 Internal factors include the ADR skills and expertise of each Conciliation Officer and their 
willingness to exercise those skills. This would also include their personal preference for finalising matters 
quickly, their ability to assist the worker to articulate their interest, and their ability to craft options that 
would meet parties’ expectations. 
 The next graph shows the decline in numbers of new requests from 16,791 in the year 2004/5 to 
12,592 in the year 2008/9, and then the gradual increase in new requests to a peak of 18,039 in 2013/14 
with a slight decline to 16,982 in 2014/15. 
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New requests, reopened requests and finalised matters. 
ACCS Annual Reports; series 2004/5 to 2014/15 
 
 The difference between new requests and total requests are files that are reopened. The number of 
re-opened matters doubled from 1,120 in 2013/14 to 2,215 in 2014/15. A managerial directive about 
when to suspend a matter, thereby administratively reducing the completion time, was made in 2014. 
Prior to 2014 Conciliation Officers decided when to suspend a matter. For instance, if the Worker was 
not ready to proceed but wanted the opportunity to conciliate the matter at a later date. 
 The category ‘matters finalised’ refers to the completed matters whether resolved or not. These 
matters have been issued an Outcome Certificate which sets out the terms of the resolution or, if not 
resolved, states that the worker has made reasonable steps to settle the dispute and may now proceed to 
Court. The graph above shows that there is a widening gap between the total number of matters and 
those finalised. In 2013/14 matters finalised almost equalled total matters, catching up some of the gap 
opened in 2012/13. In 2014/15 this gap of about 1,500 matters outstanding again appeared. 
 The Annual Reports provides a calculation of Equivalent Full-time (EFT) Conciliation Officers. 
The sharp increase in disputes lodged in 2012 and in 2013was matched with increase of 4.8 EFT 
Conciliation Officers in late 2013. Since then the EFT Conciliation Officers has declined. 
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Equivalent Full-time Conciliation Officers 
ACCS Annual Reports; series 2004/5 to 2014/15 
 
 This next graph shows a reducing proportion of part-time Conciliation Officers, noting that this 
information was not reported in the 2005/06 ACCS Annual Report. 
 
Comparison of Full time and Part time Conciliation Officers 
ACCS Annual Reports; series 2006/7 to 2014/15 
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 Comparing this graph with the resolution rate graph shows a correlation between the smaller 
proportion of part-time Conciliation Officers and the declining resolution rate. One explanation may be 
found in the high stress nature of the work and the relentless constancy of the workload. A continual high 
level of stress has a negative impact on an individual’s decision making capacity and efficacy (van Bos 
2009). Further exploration of this phenomenon would provide better information leading to targeted 
strategies that would protect individual Conciliation Officers from the health impacts of ongoing stress 
and achieve better outcomes for disputants. 
 The final graph shows the annual number of disputes allocated to each EFT Conciliation Officer 
has steadily climbed from a low of 398 in 2006/7 to last year’s high of 526. As the numbers of disputes 
per EFT Conciliation Officer has steadily climbed, there is widening gap between the numbers allocated 
and the numbers resolved. The smallest gap was 141 unresolved matters per Conciliation Officer EFT in 
2006/7 and 2007/8. This gap has blown out to 227 unresolved matters per Conciliation Officer EFT in 
2014/15. 
 
Comparison of Total disputes/EFT Conciliation Officer to resolved 
disputes/EFTConciliation Officer 
ACCS Annual Reports; series 2004/5 to 2014/15 
 
 This graph clearly shows the increasing work load with a corresponding increasing gap between 
allocated matters and resolved matters per EFT Conciliation Officer. Work intensification, from both an 
increased number of disputes allocated per EFT and the diminishing proportion of part-time Conciliation 
Officers, would undoubtedly be a contributing factor. Additionally, the effects of no independent 
mechanisms to set standards of behaviour for the repeat players, the Insurance Agents, will compound 
over time. As Agents test the boundaries of poor behaviour, finding no repercussions from the ACCS, 
their behaviour can only deteriorate. This will lead to further declines in resolution rates, more unhappy 
workers and more disputes heading towards the Courts. 
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Implications 
 The key aims of statutory ADR as set out in the Act are fairness, informality, quickness and 
efficiency, and are therefore the measures of the success of the ACCS. This study is interested in fairness in 
ADR and, while carefully avoiding delving into the nature of fairness, attempts to bring fairness to the 
forefront of the ADR professional’s mind. Historically the ACCS reports on but has not set targets for 
resolution rates, stating that this is influenced by external factors such as the decision-making of the 
insurance agent and the attitude of workers to appealing to the Court. However, resolution rates do not 
necessarily equate with fairness, nor does ‘satisfaction’, despite being a traditional evaluative measure of 
ADR processes and outcomes. 
 Resolution may not be indicative of a worker’s satisfaction with the settlement. In my experience 
workers will frequently be guided by the Conciliator or their Workers Representative and will accept a 
settlement offer they may not think is fair but consider it is the best they will get without going to Court. A 
settlement may not be fair. Some workers simply do not know what a reasonable entitlement is in the 
circumstances. They may be satisfied and the dispute may settle, but an external objective observer may 
question the fairness of the outcome. Additionally, the relief and pleasure felt when treated with respect 
and dignity throughout the process, i.e. being afforded interactional justice, will influence a worker’s 
reporting of their satisfaction levels. But clearly, satisfaction with a process or an outcome does not 
necessarily equal fairness or achieve justice. 
 The inherent power imbalance of the current system can lead to workers accepting lower 
settlements than they could be entitled to, and a reluctance to take the matter further. Unexamined 
assumptions about power can also lead to the conciliator using their skills to persuade the less powerful to 
accept a lower settlement. This may not seem like coercion, but it is (Scutt, 1988). 
 This analysis challenges the view that participant satisfaction is a valid measure of success of a 
conciliation process. 
 What then are the criteria by which the ACCS service is to be judged? Surely one must be the 
standard of conduct and actions of the conciliation process. Dunn (2013) raises problems inherent in 
selecting ‘made a reasonable effort’ as the primary measure of whether the service has met its statutory duty to 
be mindful of fairness. It is not enough that a professional ADR practitioner has done something. 
 A reasonable effort does not necessarily mean reasonable offers and counter offers have been made, 
or that accepted ADR sub-processes such as identifying issues and exploring underlying interests and 
concerns are undertaken to a professional level. A reasonable effort may simply be that the Conciliation 
Officer contacted each party, or a worker attended the conciliation conference. There are nationally 
accepted standards of practice for conciliation, recently revised by the Mediator Standards Board (NMAS 
2015), that can be measured. Enquiries can be made about the form and content of what is done in a 
conciliation process. 
 Satisfaction of the stakeholders is not mentioned in the Act, either in the objectives nor in the 
Conciliation Officers duties. The Act refers to fairness. Measures of stakeholder satisfaction do not 
necessarily correspond to the achievement of fairness. If satisfaction is used as a standard, then 
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impracticable and unreasonable offers and counter offers could be made and accepted because the worker 
believe themselves to be effectively powerless to achieve a better result. Similarly, reasonable proposals 
and offers could be rejected, because the insurer is not negatively impacted by a lack of resolution. In 
both instance a conciliation still be considered to be have been conducted and the Conciliation Officer to 
have made reasonable efforts to bring the parties to settlement. 
 With the current standard of scrutiny, Insurers Agents have incentives to block and resist 
reasonable proposals and there is no recourse available to Conciliation Officers, while worker’s only 
recourse is the expense and stress of Court. The lack of statutory restraints on the behaviour of the 
insurers, may limit the opportunity for the weaker party, the worker, to have their issues and concerns 
given full consideration, leading to less favourable outcomes. 
 Issues of power-imbalance are real problems, but better understanding their impact on the 
conciliation process and outcomes can be used to lift standards. Similarly, difficulties related to the 
evaluation of the conciliation process and its impact on the achievement of fairness is too important to be 
set aside easily. 
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has raised questions about the practise of ADR in conciliation, the ability of 
Conciliation Officers to manage the conduct of repeat players, the motivations of repeat players to make 
reasonable offers and counter offers, and the impact of power differentials on the weaker party’s capacity 
to reach a fair settlement. The analysis throws light on the increasing intensification of work, already a 
high stress and high volume environment, for Conciliation Officers. The overall resolution rate is slowly 
declining, suggesting that this work intensification is somehow impacting on the Conciliation Officer’s 
efforts to bring the parties to agreement. Investigation of the conduct and decision-making of repeat 
players in statutory conciliation and the effect it has on achieving fairness and settlements is warranted. 
 As the ADR profession matures, steps to ensure that fairness and justice are upheld in these 
private arenas can be taken. Properly conducted research and the establishment of standards and criteria 
that reliably and validly measure fairness are within the professional expertise of the industry. This 
exploratory study provides some support for embarking on rigorous testing of ADR processes and for 
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